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eloquence, almost into passion towards its close, the book is in its fundamental attitude an admirable contribution on a most important subject.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION. A STUDY IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

By E. S. P. Haynes, late scholar of Balliol College, Oxford.

Issued for the Rationalist Press Association. London: Watts & Co., 1906. Second and Popular Edition, pp. 92.

Many interesting points are raised in this essay, and some interesting things are said, but there is a curious sense of inconclusiveness throughout and the conclusions reached are not convincing as an adequate account of the matter. This is partly due, no doubt, to the complexity of the subject, of which, to do him justice, it must be said that Mr. Haynes is quite conscious; and indeed this consciousness is one of the merits of the book, reinforced as it is by wide and alert reading. But the chief cause seems to lie in the omission to state clearly what is perhaps the greatest argument against persecution.

This is simply that it is not justifiable to punish men for doing what they think right, however mistaken, in the same spirit as we punish them for doing what they believe to be wrong. The battle for toleration is, in short, a battle for liberty of conscience as well as for liberty of thought. There is a passage at the end of the book that makes one inclined to say that Mr. Haynes has not only not stated this principle; he has not even grasped it. He contemplates, apparently, with equanimity, "the State occasionally inflicting small fines in the police court on priests who frighten sick persons with fears of hell, just as it now pursues this policy with women who make money by telling domestic servants their fortunes" (p. 85). But this comparison entirely misses the vital point: no one tells fortunes from a high sense of duty; while no one, except from such a sense, it may safely be said, preaches now or is likely ever to preach again the unpopular and terrible doctrine of hell.

To overlook this principle is to obscure the historic outlook. Mr. Haynes starts with pointing out, well and clearly, that the facile theory which makes toleration and skepticism stand and fall together cannot be right. "This would involve putting men

like Socrates . . . into the same category as Pyrrho . . . " (p. 11). But in the main he can only supplement such a confessedly inadequate view by the conception of an "implicit" as distinct from an "explicit" skepticism, and even this conception is blurred for the reader by a double use of the word "skepticism;" sometimes it seems to mean the inquiring spirit of free speculation (*e. g.*, on p. 83), sometimes (*e. g.*, on p. 11) the conviction that no substantial truth on religious matters is attainable by man.

Yet Mr. Haynes sees and points out that it was to men like Thomas More, Oliver Cromwell, and the Quakers, men of the most intense religious belief, that the cause of toleration owed its great advances. Why? Simply because they saw (what, by the way, Marcus Aurelius did *not* see) that once men's hearts were in the right place, they should be left, as far as possible, free to do what they themselves believe to be their bounden duty. No doubt the belief in everlasting hell and in an infallible revelation hindered recognition of this. If there was an infallible revelation, it was bold to believe that some men could not discern it if so they wished; and again, if all men had only one chance of discovering truth in this life and must, if they missed it, perish everlastingly, it seemed running a fearful risk to let "pestilent heretics" spread their poison, and not root them out while there was yet time. Doubt, therefore, on these two points did clear the way, but none the less, neither the belief in "exclusive salvation" nor yet the disbelief in conscientious error is inevitably bound up with the conception of revelation, as even the high Catholic doctrine of "invincible ignorance" clearly shows. It is more than half a compliment to Mr. Haynes' work that a criticism of it inevitably tends to pass into a discussion on the whole subject; but there are a few places (*e. g.*, on p. 66) where a severe critic can only deplore that his hatred of priestcraft has betrayed him into begging the question and assuming, as a basis for discussion, that the arguments of the "skeptic" are irrefragable and the conclusions of the "believer" idiotic. This is the kind of writing that tempts one to call a Rationalist press rather rationalistic than rational, and a writer like Mr. Haynes ought not to countenance it.

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